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Carsten Hefeker and Mathias Moersch* 
Possible Effects of EMU on German 
Long-Term Interest Rates 
It is often argued that long-term German bonds suffer from an inflation premium caused 
by EMU. A decomposition of long rates shows that factors besides inflationary 
expectations and conversion risk affect the long bond yield. The following paper 
therefore discusses a more complete set of channels through which currency union 
affects interest rates and argues that they do not all point in the direction of rising rates. 
Data generating processes for long-term bonds are specified and tested for structural 
breaks. Absence of a structural break is interpreted as evidence against a premium 
caused by EMU. 
T he prospect of European Monetary Union (EMU) at the turn of the century already affects today's long 
bonds, since some of which will mature at a time 
when the new monetary policy regime is expected to 
be in place. Consequently prices on long bonds, at 
least in part, reflect an assessment of the effects of 
EMU on monetary policy. German bond yields in 
particular, it is argued, may suffer from a premium 
reflecting doubts about the ability of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) to deliver stable prices. 1 
This paper addresses theoretically the question of 
EMU effects incorporated in interest rates in the 
context of the expectations theory of the term 
structure. We show that a number of components, not 
only expected inflation, drive the long rate. A 
discussion of those components shows that the effect 
of EMU on long-term interest rates is ambiguous. 
While some channels support higher interest rates, 
others point in the direction of lower rates. Problems 
that arise in empirically assessing these theoretical 
channels are then briefly discussed. It is argued that it 
is not, at least at present, feasible to disentangle 
empirically the various expected real and nominal 
effects. Consequently a more modest estimation 
strategy is turned to, in which a number of data 
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generating processes are specified and tested for 
structural breaks. For German bonds, we find very 
little evidence for a structural break. 
The Expectations Theory of the Term Structure 
The idea of a premium on German bonds is usually 
supported by a number of empirical observations. 
First, the yield spread in Germany is near to a historic 
high (Figure 1). Second, in 1995 long-term US interest 
rates fell below German levels despite the fact that 
rates at the short end were lower in Germany than in 
the USA. Third, there is some anecdotal evidence that 
German savers avoid domestic bonds in favour of 
investments abroad. 
On the other hand, 10-year bonds are near to a 
historic low in Germany (also Figure 1). This makes 
it hard to argue that long-term interest rates are too 
high. Second, a steep yield curve is not inconsistent 
with the current state of the economy. 2 Third, lack of 
demand at the domestic retail level may easily be 
offset by other investor groups. Finally, comparisons 
with the United States are complicated by the fact 
that the two countries are at different stages of the 
business cycle. Thus simply considering interest rate 
' B. R i i ey : Tales of the Unexpected in Global Bonds, in: Financial 
Times, 13 September 1995; and A. Ka le tsky :  German Savers 
Have Lost Faith in 'Camembert' Mark, i~: The Times, 22 February 
1996. 
2 The relationship between yield spreads and real economic activity 
is discussed in: M. Moersch :  Interest Rates or Spreads as 
Predictors of Real Economic Activity, in: Konjunkturpolitik, VoL 42 
(1996), pp. 40-52. 
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levels and spreads to assess the existence of a risk 
premium is not satisfactory. A more complete 
treatment is instead possible in the context of the 
expectations theory of the term structure. This 
framework allows the development of the various 
channels that can affect long-term rates in reaction to 
EMU. 
The long rate, according to the expectations theory 
of the term structure, is the average of expected short 
rates over the horizon of the long bond plus a term 
premium. The term premium is time varying and 
among other things rewards holders of long bonds for 
the exposure to greater market volatility. 
Using a linear approximation, L~', the n-period long- 
term bond is an average of current and expected one 
period short-term rates, St. S*t.t+k denotes rational 
expectations about the short-term rate at time t+k, 
formed at time t. Pt is a term premium. 
L2= nLk=o 
(1) 
This standard expression for the long bond 
changes when currency union occurs at time c, before 
the bond matures. 
' [n~_.l ~*,DMq,' F~..~ Q*'Eur~177 
L2=nLk= ~ ~'t,t+kdznLk= c ,-,t,t+k j~Pt+Ct (2) 
This expression captures the fact that the process 
for the short rate changes after currency union. The 
superscripts DM and Euro reflect the fact that some 
short-term rates will be generated under the old DM 
Figure 1 
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regime, while some will already incorporate the new 
policy regime of the ECB. We also introduce a 
separate term premium Ct, capturing the risks specific 
to currency union. 
Finally, the nominal rate can be decomposed into a 
real rate plus inflation 
St = Rt + [Tt (3) 
to yield 
Fn-c-I q 
L2= I I (R*.DM 
nL.__Z=0  ,,,+. ,,,+./j 
n,  
(4) 
Equation (4) allows a number of observations about 
possible EMU effects: 
[] There are a number of different channels that can 
affect the long-term interest rate, namely the 
expected real short-term rate, expected inflation, and 
premiums. These factors, and some of the forces 
driving their development will be discussed below. 
[] Once EMU commences at time c, the time series 
behaviour of the short-term rate will be influenced by 
a different monetary policy regime and thus will 
possibly change. However, there still exist bonds that 
are unaffected by this effect. The distinction between 
bonds that mature before and after EMU will be 
employed empirically later in the paper. 
In the following we aim to provide a comprehensive 
overview of the possible effects on long-term interests 
rates under EMU. They should, of course, already be 
visible in the long-term bond yields that come due 
after 1. January 1999, when EMU is likely to be 
operating. 
Influences on Real Interest Rates 
Three channels of influence of exchange rate 
variability on real output can be distinguished. It can 
either affect trade because of transaction costs, it can 
have an influence on profits from trade, and it can 
thus finally have an influence on the level of 
production. 
The most obvious reason for expecting significant 
economic gains from a common currency is the 
abolition of all exchange related transaction costs. As 
those costs make transborder transactions more 
expensive than domestic trade, they can be viewed 
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like a tax on international trade in goods and assets. 3 
These direct effects have been estimated by the 
European Commission to be around one-fourth to 
one-half of one per cent of the GDP of the Union. Gros 
and Thygesen have argued that the effects of the 
savings of transaction costs are of the same order of 
magnitude as the abolition of border controls under 
the common market programme and thus as large as 
those calculated by the Checchini Report. Hence the 
overall GDP in the Union could rise by as much as 
4.5-6.5 percent. 4 As monetary union expands trade, 
the standard gains from trade also increase. 
Moreover, dynamic effects can be expected from a 
common currency. The increase in overall efficiency 
resulting from the common currency and the increase 
in trade translates into an increase of the marginal 
productivity of capital. This should lead to higher 
investment and to a higher capital stock, which in turn 
leads to more output with the same labour force. The 
multiplier estimated pertaining to the output effect 
from induced capital formation is 2. 5 
The expectation of important microeconomic 
benefits from a reduction in exchange rate variability 
is moreover based on the idea that exchange rate 
variability makes trade more risky. Apart from pure 
transaction costs that arise from currency diversity, 
the variability of exchange rates can directly influence 
the profits of a trading firm? If a firm is, because of 
strong competition in the export market, forced to fix 
its foreign prices rather than being able to adjust them 
according to exchange rate changes so that profits in 
domestic currency remain stable, every exchange rate 
change translates into a firm's profits. 7 A risk-averse 
firm will trade less than it would do in the absence of 
profit risk. 
Finally, the Commission's study on the common 
currency predicts that reduced uncertainty from a 
R B. K e n e n : Sorting Out Some EMU Issues, lecture delivered at 
the European University Institute, Florence, 28 March 1996. 
4 Cf. European Commission: One Market, One Money, in: European 
Economy, Vol. 44 (1990); and D. Gros  and N. Thygesen:  
European Monetary Integration, London: Longman (1992), 
respectively. 
R. B a l d w i n : On the Microeconomics of the European Monetary 
Union, in: European Economy Special edition 1 (1991), pp. 21-35. 
Most empirical studies fail to support this view because they 
look at rather short time-periods for which hedging opportunities 
are available. When looking at longer time periods (beyond one year), 
a negative effect of variability on trade has been found 
(R De Grauwe and B. de Be l le f ro id :  Long-Run Exchange 
Rate Variability and International Trade, in: S. Arndt  and 
D. R ichardson ,  (eds) : Real Financial Linkages Among Open 
Economies, Cambridge: MIT-Press (1989), pp. 193-212). For a brief 
survey of the literature, cf. C. Hefeker :  The Political Choice and 
Collapse of Fixed Exchange Rates, in: Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics, Vol. 152 (1996), pp. 360-379. 
common currency leads to more investment across 
borders. 8 One possible explanation might be that 
uncertainty, in the presence of entry and exit costs, 
implies that firms are hesitant to invest in new 
markets. If future profits are not certain because their 
domestic currency value is variable, a firm is unlikely 
to undertake a costly investment decision. Only rather 
large profit opportunities would induce even a risk 
neutral firm to invest in new markets. Thus, those 
costs would create a band of inaction (or hysteresis) 
around given exchange rates. This also implies that 
market structure changes due to exchange rate 
changes are persistent3 
The sign of these microeconomic effects on the real 
interest rate should be positive. Capital should be 
more productive if it is possible to reap more gains 
from trade, and enlarged investment opportunities 
should also drive up the interest rate. It is clear, 
however, that those possible effects are probably only 
realized in the medium to long term and not with the 
start of EMU. 
EMU and Unemployment 
The positive effects on firms' output and profits 
should also have an influence on the level of 
(un)employment in the member countries of EMU. 
Indeed, Gros has recently established a direct relation 
between exchange rate variability and unemployment. 
In a simple econometric exercise he showed that 
whenever exchange rate variability in the EMS 
increased it had a negative impact on the rate of 
employment in Germany? ~ In contrast, he was not 
able to derive a significant effect of interest rates or 
the level of exchange rates on employment. Thus, he 
7 C. Bet ts  andM. B. Devereux :  The Exchange Rate in a Model 
of Pricing-to-Market, in: European Economic Review, Vol. 40 (1996), 
pp. 1007-1021; and R Krugman: Exchange Rate Instability, 
Cambridge: MIT-Press, 1989. M. Knetter: International Comparisons 
of Pricing-to-Market Behavior, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 83 
(1993), pp. 473-486, reports estimates of the proportion of industries 
that are subject to "local currency price stability". His highest 
estimate is for Germany, where 89 per cent of industry are subject to 
pricing to market. 
European Commission, op. cit. 
9 Cf. A. D ix i t :  Hysteresis, Imports Penetration, and Exchange 
Rate Pass-Through, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 104 
(1989), pp. 205-227; and R. Ba ldwin  and R Krugman:  
Persistent Trade Effects of Large Exchange Rate Shocks, in: 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, VoL 104 (1989), pp. 633-654. 
'~ D. Gros :  Germany's Stake in Exchange Rate Stability, in: 
INTERECONOMICS, Vol. 31 (1996), pp. 236-240. See also the 
comment by A. Jung: Is There a Causal Relationship between 
Exchange Rate Volatility and Unemployment?, in: INTER- 
ECONOMICS, Vol.31 (1996), pp. 281-282, who rejects Gros' results 
by using a more sophisticated econometric method. Note, however, 
that Gros' results are theoretically consistent with the evidence on 
exchange rate hysteresis. 
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concludes that it is indeed the variability and not the 
level of exchange rates that matters. And, in 
accordance with the above argument about the 
microeconomic implications of exchange rate 
variability, Gros finds that investment growth is also 
negatively correlated with exchange rate variability in 
Germany. Given high hiring and firing costs in 
European countries, the hysteresis in trading patterns 
and investment directly translates into persistent 
labour market effects. Every reduction in the level of 
employment that is due to exchange rate variability 
leads to a persistent increase in the rate of 
unemploymentJ' 
Thus, if monetary union leads to less 
unemployment because of reduced exchange rate 
variability, this should lower the expected real interest 
rate under EMU. Less unemployment puts less 
pressure on fiscal authorities and the social security 
system which would reduce the drain on the capital 
market. 
EMU and Public Finances 
One of the most debated issues is the fiscal 
adjustment hat member states need to make in order 
to qualify for EMU. Deficits near three per cent of GDP 
and public debts near 60 per cent (or levels moving 
sufficiently fast towards those targets) require severe 
fiscal contractions in most of the countries aiming to 
enter EMU in 1999. Those target levels for public 
finances are widely disputed because in the current 
situation, with increasing rates of unemployment in 
most European countries, they are perceived to have 
an adverse effect on employment as particularly 
public sector employment is reduced where possible. 
The longer run effect on this adjustment of public 
finances on real interest rates is, however, generally 
expected to be negative as public demands on the 
capital markets are reduced. This being the case, 
1, Cf. L. Bal l :  Disinflation and the NAIRU, NBER Working Paper 
552o (1996). 
,2 R B. Ke nen:  Economic and Monetary Union in Europe. Moving 
Beyond Mastricht, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
13 Many sources expect that the demand for dollar reserves by EMU 
members will drop dramatically. This is because external trade of the 
cure currency area as a share of GDP will fall and thus reduce the 
demand for currency reserves. Dependent on how large the member 
group will be, estimates of the excess stock of dollar reserves range 
between 30 and 70 billion dollars (The Economist, 19 October 1996). 
'~ European Monetary Institute: Transfer by the NCBs of Foreign 
Reserve Assets to the ECB, October 1995. 
15 Cf. the statement by the Commerzbank: The Euro - Serious 
Competition for the Dollar?, in: Financial Times, 20 September 1996. 
markets should expect that the burden of public 
demands on the capital markets are reduced for those 
countries making their way into EMU. Because of the 
requirements for entry, it seems obvious that public 
finances can only move one way: towards 
consolidation. Thus, expected long-term interest 
rates for those in EMU should fall. 
Influences on Nominal Interest Rates 
While the euro is expected to acquire some of the 
importance of the deutsche mark and the French 
franc as an international reserve currency, the 
demand for the newly created money may actually 
even drop, as Kenen has argued. 12 This is simply 
because intra-European foreign exchange reserves 
are no longer necessary. They will be converted into 
cure and no longer be usable for intervention. 
Through this effect the share of euro in international 
reserves is likely to drop. 
However, one might expect that the cure will 
increasingly be held by third countries, as US dollars 
or gold are held now for intervention or reserve 
purposesJ 3 The EMI, for example, reports that some 
third countries have already expressed an interest in 
changing from dollar to euro reservesJ 4 Other sources 
as well report that the demand for cure as a currency 
reserve will probably be larger than that for, e.g., the 
deutsche mark, but will not challenge the dollar's 
positionJ ' Whether this adjustment in demand for 
cure reserves will be gradual (as Kenen suggest) or 
fast is open? 6 In any case, the increased demand for 
cure-denominated bonds should lower the interest 
rate level in Europe. 
The Euro as a Vehicle and Invoice Currency 
Most of the literature on the possible external 
effects of EMU has tried to assess the chances that 
the euro will become internationally more important, 
perhaps even rivaling the US dollar as a major vehicle 
currencyJ 7 Available evidence is, of course, only 
retrospective but shows that major shifts in the use of 
~ The latter position is taken by G. A logoskouf i s  and 
R. Por tes :  International Costs and Benefits from EMU, in: 
European Economy Special edition 1 (1991), pp. 231-245. 
17 Of. ibid., and P. Har tmann:  The Future of the Euro as an 
International Currency, paper presented to the CEPS working party 
"The Passage to the Euro", Brussels, 24 June 1996. A vehicle 
currency is a currency that is used by governments and residents of 
other countries. It is officially used for intervention in the exchange 
market and as currency reserve. Private use is often made in 
commodity markets and exchange markets to save time and effort by 
quoting values in one common denominator. This can also save 
costs, as transaction costs fall in highly liquid markets. 
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vehicle currencies are very slow. Since money has 
important network externalities, currencies once 
chosen as vehicle currencies have a strong tendency 
to keep this role. '9 For example, the British pound 
sterling remained a major currency even after the 
British lost their dominant role in world markets after 
World War II and is still important for some former 
British colonies. In contrast, the deutsche mark has 
only very gradually gained "market share" vis-&-vis 
the dollar. Only in Eastern Europe does the deutsche 
mark play a significant role as an external currency. 
Thus, the external importance of the euro will 
probably take some time to increase given path- 
dependency in the choice of international currencies. 
For those countries already using European 
currencies as a denominator, however, this effect 
could materialize rather quickly, i.e. on the very day in 
which the former currencies are changed into euro. 
That should be important for many Eastern and 
Central European countries which currently use the 
deutsche mark, and former colonies of EU members, 
such as members of the CFA-franc zone in Africa. 2~ 
Those effects suggest that while the demand for 
euro will possibly increase, the effect will not be too 
strong, at least initially. Demand will also be a positive 
function of the stability of the new currency. Monetary 
stability should also be important for the decision to 
use the euro as an invoice currency. Even more 
important for this latter effect is, of course, the share 
of the EU's trade with third countries. Since the EMU 
area will be a major partner in world trade, its currency 
will naturally be used as a currency of invoice in EU 
related trade; however, with the possible exclusion of 
trade with the dollar area. In both uses, as a vehicle 
and as an invoice currency, we would rather expect a 
positive effect on interest rates as the demand for the 
euro increases. 
Portfolio Adjustments 
One of the expected effects from monetary union 
for the countries in the EU is that they are no longer 
exposed to exchange rate risk vis-&-vis their 
European trading partners. This may or may not have 
real effects on investment, profits and employment, 
~ R Krugman:  Vehicle Currencies and the Structure of 
International Exchange, in: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 
Vol. 12 (1980), pp. 503-526. 
,9 R B. Kenen:  Economic and Monetary Union in Europe, op. cir. 
notices that the reduction in the number of currencies with EMU 
might have a profound effect on the vehicle role of the dollar because 
the necessity of a vehicle currency is a positive function of the 
number of currencies existing. 
but it certainly saves transaction costs and hedging 
costs. As long as hedging opportunities exist, real 
decisions should not be affected by exchange rate 
uncertainty. If complete hedging markets do not exist, 
however, firms may look for other ways to insure 
against fluctuating currency values. 
One possible way to insure against fluctuating 
currencies is to exploit the covariance structure of 
several currencies. For example, if a company has 
business interests in several countries whose 
currencies usually move in opposite directions, it can 
exploit this fact since its overall exposure to both 
currency risks is diminished. An example is the case 
of the US-dollar and the deutsche mark. These two 
currencies often move in opposite directions, whereas 
other currencies tend to be weak vis-&-vis the 
deutsche mark when the dollar is weak as well. For 
those currencies dollar and deutsche mark 
movements may cancel out. If the same effect is true 
for intra-European movements in exchange rates, the 
elimination of this possibility to hedge by holding 
several currencies may induce international firms to 
acquire currencies outside EMU. 2~ This would 
potentially drive up interest rates in Europe as funds 
flow out. 
Apart from this effect, the importance of the EMU 
area for portfolio and direct investments is contingent 
on its performance in terms of monetary stability. The 
attractiveness of investments in the currency area 
depends on the real developments of the market and 
thus picks up the real effects from monetary union 
that we have discussed above. 
Influences on the Risk Premium 
Risk premiums in general compensate for various 
uncertainties. In the case of EMU, uncertainty 
surrounding conversion rates from national currencies 
into euro is of particular importance. We see three 
sources of uncertainty: 
[]  Several authors have suggested that countries 
might have an incentive to manipulate their exchange 
rate vis-&-vis the euro shortly before conversion. 22 
This "surprise" devaluation would be undertaken to 
gain price competitiveness in the common market. 
20 p.B. Kenen:  Economic and Monetary Union in Europe, op. cit. 
2~ B. E i c h e n g r e e n : Should the Maastricht Treaty be Saved?, in: 
Princeton Studies in International Finance, Voi. 74 (1992). 
22 Cf.e.g.M. F ra t iann i ,  J. von Hagen andC. Wal ler :  The 
Maastricht Way to EMU, in: Princeton Essays in International Finance, 
Vol. 187 (1992). 
148 INTERECONOMICS, May/June 1997 
REPORT 
[]  As a practical matter, there may also be a rounding 
of exchange rates to facilitate conversion. This may 
be important o increase the willingness of consumers 
and producers to undertake the necessary changes of 
price tags. 
rqThere is a legal uncertainty concerning the 
convertibility of debt contracts from a national 
currency into euro. 
All three effects will result in a positive risk premium 
for German bonds. Kenen, however, convincingly 
shows that some of these fears contradict clear 
requirements of the Maastricht Treaty? The treaty 
states that the locking of exchange rates must not 
alter the external value of the ECU and rules out any 
changes in the weight of the currencies in the ECU 
basket, in addition, the Madrid summit decided that 
the euro and the ECU must be exchangeable on a 
one-for-one basis at the start of EMU. Kenen then 
argues that there is only one way to simultaneously 
fulfil the requirements of the Treaty and the Madrid 
summit: if the locking of exchange rates on 1. January 
1999 takes place at the prevailing market levels. This 
would of course imply that countries cannot decide 
on the conversion rate, but they might nevertheless 
try to manipulate their entry level. 
Expected Inflation 
Most of the empirical approaches that study the 
forward interest rates as a predictor for EMU focus on 
the expected increase of inflation for Germany and 
reduced inflation for certain other countries. Thus, the 
more likely markets perceive EMU to be, the higher 
the premium on long-term German bonds should be. 
For this to be true, of course, the hypothesis must 
hold that average inflation will indeed increase in 
Germany. Zettelmeyer in his study fails to find such an 
effect? In particular, he does not find that German 
bonds and those of less stable currencies move in the 
opposite direction. This would suggest that markets 
do not expect average inflation in EMU to increase. 
One explanation could be that the European Central 
Bank is expected to follow an even more restrictive 
monetary policy than the Bundesbank, simply to 
prove those wrong who expect it to be less stability 
oriented.~S 
Indeed, according to a recent poll German 
2, R B. K e n e n : Sorting Out Some EMU Issues, op. cit. 
24 j .  Zet te l  meyer :  EMU and Long Interest Rates in Germany, in: 
Paul J. J. Wel fens  (ed.): European Monetary Union: Transition, 
International Impacts and Policy Options, Berlin: Springer-Verlag 
1997. 
enterprises do not expect inflation under EMU to 
increase. When asked what they fear as a negative 
implication of EMU, they did not mention higher 
inflation? 
But even if those inflationary expectations did exist, 
it could be that other effects are stronger than the 
inflationary mark-up on long-term bonds. As argued 
above, the expected real effects from EMU might 
more than compensate for fears of inflation. The fact 
that those real effects may also vary for different 
European economies could imply that they 
compensate different inflation expectations for 
different currencies in Europe so that the overall effect 
is not clear. 27 
Discussion 
We summarize the various effects as follows 
L~=RJI!j(TA'Eff)'Gi(Maastricht'+~ _~ UEi(I~)) 1 (5) 
+ 
- 
] 
where all variables express changes vis-&-vis the 
current pre-EMU level of the respective variable in 
comparison to the national currencies or, respectively, 
to the euro. We expect the long-term interest rate for 
a particular currency to be a composition of country 
specific effects and of common effects due to EMU. 
The real effects I are country specific and comprise 
efficiency gains (Eft) and the reduction in transaction 
25 In fact, at least according to its statutes, the ECB should be more 
inflation averse than the Bundesbank. Its only mission is to provide 
monetary stability (while the Bundesbank is also responsible for 
general economic developments), and it is nominally even more 
independent han the Bundesbank. 
26 Of. A. Juehems,  G. Nerb and D. Radowsk i :  Vorberei- 
tungsmassnahmen der Unternehmen auf die Europ&ische 
W&hrungsunion, in: Ifo-Schnelldienst 15 (1996), pp. 3-9. 
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costs (TA), the reduction of the government's fiscal 
burden due to the Maastricht fiscal criteria 
(Maastricht) and the reduction in unemployment due 
to increased investment (UE). As the importance of 
these effects is likely to differ from country to country, 
this effect is indexed. 
Secondly we expect nominal influences from 
changes in the money demand (relatively to money 
supply) affecting all countries similarly once the euro 
operates. There is the demand for currency reserves 
(CR), which is a function of the variability of the 
exchange rate (e) with third countries. Also, we have 
the demand for vehicle currencies (veh), which is 
again a function of the union's share in world trade 
and the inflation rate of the euro ~. The same influence 
is expected for the demand of the euro as an invoicing 
currency (inv). Moreover, there might be adjustments 
in the portfolio composition of currency demands (PF) 
that is dependent on cross hedging effects (i.e. the 
covariance of the euro to other currencies) and the 
sum of efficiency gains in the member countries. 
Finally, there is a pure risk premium that reflects the 
effects of increased (lowered) inflation and the 
insecurity of bond holders concerning the rate of 
conversion from national currency into euro. As the 
sign of the inflation change is country specific, this 
risk premium is again country specific. It is only this 
single effect that most of the literature has focused 
on. Apparently, its influence is mitigated by all the 
other effects we have listed in the foregoing 
discussion. 
The various effects cannot provide one single and 
clear answer concerning the effects EMU might have 
on interest rates in the monetary union. We have 
identified positive effects and negative effects whose 
relative strength cannot be determined unambig- 
uously. Moreover, they are all derived under the 
assumption that the money supply is stable. While it 
is obvious that the ECB will do its best to stabilize the 
effects from shifts in money demand, this is not a 
trivial task, as our discussion shows. It might be 
relatively easy to account for shifts in stocks, but it is 
a much harder task to control for shifts in flows. Given 
these controllability problems for the ECB, the likely 
results of monetary policy in EMU are hard to predict. 
This might ultimately also be one reason for the 
perceived risk premium on long-term bonds in 
European currencies. 
Empirical Evidence 
Ideally, an empirical investigation should attempt o 
identify the various channels outlined in the 
theoretical discussion. The problem with such an 
approach is that it requires the identification of 
expectations about the future development of at least 
three distinct variables, namely real rates, nominal 
rates, and the risk premium. While some empirical 
methods have been proposed to deal with this 
problem, none are particularly helpful in this context. 
Studies that decompose interest rates into real and 
nominal components drawing on historical data and 
under the assumption of rational expectations, are 
able to recover inflationary expectations. 28While such 
an approach can be helpful in providing a historical 
analysis, it is not suitable for giving an assessment of 
interest rate developments ahead. 29 
An alternative approach is to rely on survey data 
about expectations. However, survey data has 
considerable weaknesses as well. First, the ability of 
surveys to measure expectations adequately is 
questionable, since participants have little incentive to 
forecast correctly. Second, and more fundamentally, 
survey data is available for relatively short time 
horizons only, but not for the time frame under 
consideration. Given these problems with the 
estimation of an equation such as (4) or (5), we instead 
propose a simpler empirical approach, which tests a 
feature underlying the debate about the effects of 
EMU on interest rates, namely whether the behaviour 
of interest rates has changed with the possibility of 
monetary union. The test is based on the idea that 
there are two kinds of bonds currently outstanding: 
those maturing before EMU and those maturing after. 
Differences in the time series behaviour of the two 
groups of bonds should provide information about the 
possibility that EMU affects bond yields. 
Structural Shifts in the Rate Process 
Since the magnitude and direction of the various 
theoretical effects outlined above cannot be 
~7 Different real effects may be due to different degrees of openness 
(the importance of EMU thus varies), different situations of public 
finance (highly indebted countries hould see a stronger effect on 
interest rates when reducing public debt), and different organizations 
of the labour market (which would imply different influences of EMU 
on labour markets). 
2~ Cf. e.g.S. Gerlach: The Information Content of the Term 
Structure: Evidence for Germany, CEPR Discussion Paper 1264 
(1995). 
2~ An additional problem with this particular approach is that it 
requires that real rates are constant over time. As we discussed 
above, this assumption isquestionable inthe context of EMU. 
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determined empirically, we turn to a simpler and more 
fundamental test here. We seek to determine whether 
the time series behaviour of interest rates has 
changed in anticipation of EMU. In particular, 
coefficients of a model describing the determination 
of interest rates should change once the EMU effect, 
which is omitted from the model, becomes important. 
We consider two groups of bonds, those maturing 
before 1999, the planned starting date of EMU, and 
those maturing after 1999. Only bonds maturing after 
1999 should show an EMU effect. 
The time span of our investigation is July 1990 to 
September 1996. The starting date is chosen to 
coincide with the beginning of German monetary and 
economic union, while the end date is dictated by 
data availability. We employ an F-test for structural 
change (see box) to test for the equality of coefficients 
before and after November 1993, the date the 
Maastricht treaty was ratified. Rejection of the null 
hypothesis of no structural change of the coefficients 
in the equation for the long bond is interpreted as 
consistent with the idea that EMU has changed 
interest rate behaviour in Germany. For EMU to be a 
credible explanation for the break, only bonds 
maturing after 1999 should display it. On the other 
hand, bonds maturing before 1999 should not show a 
break. 
A Test for Structural Change 
The unrestricted model is 
Yl =x't,61 + ~t t = 1 ..... T1 
y~ = x't,62 + st t = T1 + 1 ..... T1 + T2 
and Ho: ,61 = ,62. 
The test for a structural change of coefficients is 
given as 
(SSEc - SSEu) / k 
SSEu / (7"- 2k) 
where 
SSEu = sum of squared errors of the 
unconstrained model. 
SSEc = sum of squared errors of the constrained 
model. 
k = number of explanatory variables. 
T = T1 + T2 = sample size. 
Under the H0 of no structural change, the statistic 
has a distribution of F(k, T-2k). 
Table 1 
Marginal Significance Levels of F-tests for 
Equality of Coefficients in the Periods 
July 90 - Oct. 93 and Nov. 93 - Sept. 96 
Maturity of long bond Equation 6 Equation 7 
10-year 0.088 0.445 
8-year 0.104 0.439 
6-year 0.127 0.429 
4-year 0.176 0.412 
2-year 0.316 0.400 
Note: Marginal significance levels of an F-test of the Ho: The 
coefficients are equal in the two periods. 
We employ two models. First, a specification which 
relates changes in the bond rate to changes in the 
money market rate. Second, a more complex model, 
where the bond rate depends on own lags, the money 
market interest rate, and the state of the economy as 
measured by the annualized growth of industrial 
production and the price level. 
A Bondt = ao + alA Moneymarkett + st 
Bondt = bo + b~Bondt_7 + b2Moneymarkett 
+ b31nflationt + b41P- Growtht + st 
(6) 
(7) 
As can be seen from Table 1, the equivalence of 
coefficients can never be rejected at the 5 per cent 
level of significance and only once, using Equation(7) 
for the 10-year bond, at the 10 per cent level. Since 
our empirical methodology is unable to detect any 
evidence for a structural break in the time series 
behaviour between the sample before and after the 
ratification of the Maastricht treaty, there is no base 
for the claim that long German bonds are suffering 
from a risk premium caused by EMU? ~ 
Conclusions 
The two main conclusions of this paper are as 
follows. First, EMU can cause several real and 
nominal effects which overlap and have an uncertain 
effect on long rates. The emphasis on an inflation 
premium in explaining long-term interest rates in 
Germany is therefore misguided. Second, an analysis 
of the time series behaviour of German interest rates 
since unification does not reveal a structural break. 
This is further evidence against the existence of a 
premium caused by EMU. 
30 The issue remains that we are unable to sort out the various 
theoretical channels. It is therefore true that we cannot rule out, for 
example, that a positive inflation premium is offset by lower expected 
real interest rates. However, as discussed above, such a scenario 
must remain mere speculation. 
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